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VARA’S ORPHANS: HOW INDIGENOUS ARTISTS CAN STILL LOOK FOR HOPE IN THE MORAL 
RIGHTS REGIME 
 
Amy L. Skelton* 
INTRODUCTION 
Native American artists face many more challenges than traditional American artists 
when seeking protection for their creative works. This is partly caused by the vast 
differences between indigenous creative expressions and Western conceptions of art. Native 
American art takes many forms and is created by diverse people groups. Despite the variety 
of cultures and geography that Native American art represents, essential similarities exist 
among indigenous authors when contrasted with Western norms. Native American art is a 
fundamentally different form of art created in a fundamentally different context, and 
therefore it needs a fundamentally different form of protection. 
Native American artists face three main problems in protecting their work. First, 
they have not been able to retain an economic benefit from their expressions where an 
economic benefit is deserved. Second, they have not been able to control the dissemination 
of their art, whether it is meant to be shared with the public or whether it is meant to be kept 
private. Third, they have faced economic1 and cultural dilution of the value of their art 
                                                          
*  Notes and Comments Editor at the Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality 
1 As author Michael Brown explains, during the twentieth century, “science and technology created a 
situation in which culture arguably is a commodity. The market’s restless search for novelty turned unfamiliar 
folktales, art, and music into exploitable commercial resources.” MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE 
CULTURE? 4 (2003). 
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through fraud, modification, and unattributed borrowing of their work.2 Because many 
Native American communities have used their traditional cultural expressions as a tool to 
preserve and pass down their culture for centuries, it is vital to remedy not only the 
economic injustices that are occurring, but also the spiritual and cultural harms as well.3 
The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act4 has made strides in 
helping reunite communities with their cultural artifacts.5 However, the return of the 
physical objects to the Native American communities only goes so far. Without protection 
of the intellectual property comprising the design, the objects can be recreated and traded on 
the open market as display pieces to museums and collectors,6 or as children’s toys to 
tourists. For this reason, it is imperative to provide protection for intellectual property in 
addition to cultural artifacts. 
                                                          
2 A snapshot of the problems faced by the Hopi tribe will shed light on the complexity of these problems. The 
Hopi tribe became famous for its kachina dolls, carvings depicting deities. The design for the carvings was 
centuries old, and developed by the tribe’s ancestors. A growing market demand for the carvings led 
manufacturers in northwestern New Mexico to reproduce similar dolls to flood the market with lower-priced 
substitutes. “As a result,” says author David Jordan, “the Hopi tribe suffered not only from the cultural 
diminishment of non-native production of spiritual ‘embodiments of deities,’ but also the devaluation of the 
economic worth of the hand-carved kachina dolls.” David B. Jordan, Square Pegs and Round Holes: 
Domestic Intellectual Property Law and Native American Economic and Cultural Policy: Can it Fit?, 25 AM. 
INDIAN L. REV. 93, 99 (2000–2001). 
3 See Amina Para Matlon, Safeguarding Native American Sacred Art by Partnering Tribal Law and Equity: 
An Exploratory Case Study Applying the Bulun Bulun Equity to Navajo Sandpainting, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 
211, 220 (2004).  
Traditional creative works—perhaps through use of cultural knowledge, use of particular sacred 
designs or motifs, depiction of certain images or events or through the context in which created or 
applied—may be of great cultural and spiritual significance. Cultural information is transmitted 
through these creative works and is therefore crucial to the continuing survival of Native cultures. 
Id. 
4 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–3013 (2006). 
5 Jordan, supra note 2, at 103. 
6 See id. at 104. 
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Moral rights, which are intended to protect the spirit of the artist as expressed in her 
work, are capable of providing the protection that Native Americans need. The purpose and 
structure of moral rights law in Europe comes closer to providing for the Intellectual 
Property Rights (IPR) needs of indigenous cultures, but U.S. moral rights are so limited that 
they offer almost no protection to indigenous art. The weaknesses of moral rights law in the 
United States become an especially important problem to consider because the protections 
available through the more developed doctrines of copyright and trademark law have 
proven unhelpful and ineffective for indigenous intellectual property needs. 
Moral rights were first recognized in this country in 1990, when the United States 
passed the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA)7 in order to bring its domestic laws into 
compliance with the Berne Convention.8 However, VARA is very limited in scope.9 While 
touted at the time as an important first step, no amendments have been made in the last 
twenty years in order to improve the United States Code’s protections and bring it closer to 
international norms. 
The narrow moral rights adopted by VARA leave much to be desired for 
mainstream artists, but they do practically nothing for artists within traditionally oppressed 
groups. The United States must look at how its indigenous groups are being excluded 
                                                          
7 Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–650, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990) (codified in scattered 
sections of 17 U.S.C. (2006)). 
8  Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–650, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990) (codified in scattered 
sections of 17 U.S.C. (2006)). 
9 See § 602, 104 Stat. at 5128. (VARA applies only to authors of a “work of visual art.” A “work of visual 
art” is defined to include and exclude specific types of creative works). 
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altogether from the moral rights regime. Moral rights law should be expanded in the United 
States because it is the best tool available to protect the intellectual property of Native 
Americans. While some have recommended using specialized legislation to address the 
problem, moral rights law presents a better alternative. Using existing moral rights law in 
other international jurisdictions as a blueprint, we can transition smoothly into providing 
holistic protection for indigenous artists. 
In Part I, this Note will provide an overview of intellectual property rights that affect 
artists, and specifically will describe the state of existing U.S. moral rights law. Part II will 
apply these various legal doctrines to Native American cultural expressions, and 
demonstrate the difficulties that exist with protecting these expressions under current law. 
Part III will propose that moral rights law is well suited to protect unique aspects of Native 
American art. While acknowledging that VARA is currently deficient, this Part will argue 
that other approaches would be much less effective, and that there are no significant barriers 
to expanding VARA’s protections in the United States. 
I.  OVERVIEW OF ARTISTS’ RIGHTS 
 
A. Artists’ Rights Around the World: Copyright, Trademark, Royalty Right, and 
Moral Right 
 
1. Copyright 
 
Copyright is fundamentally an economic right. It is intended to give the copyright 
owner control over her work in order to ensure the copyright owner has the ability to 
Indiana Journal of Law & Social Equality 
Vol. 1, Issue 1 
  
  264 
 
financially benefit from the commercial value of the work.10 The overarching goal of 
intellectual property law is to assign an economic value to a good for which there is little 
economic incentive to create.11 The assumption is that intellectual property goods are 
beneficial public goods, which we want to incentivize.12 Because knowledge goods like 
songs and literature are non-exclusive and non-rivalrous, they are vulnerable to freeriding.13 
This vulnerability compromises the economic benefit that may have resulted from the 
goods’ creation. States intervene in order to protect the creators of knowledge goods from 
free riders in order to stimulate the creation of more knowledge goods.14 
An author does not need to register her work in order to receive copyright 
protection; copyright resides in the work as soon as the work is complete.15 Copyright 
originally resides in the individual author who created the work.16 U.S. copyright law does 
not recognize community authorship of a work unless each member of the group played an 
                                                          
10 See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering 
Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal 
gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and 
useful Arts.’”); see also 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A] 
(Mathew Bender, Rev. ed., 2012). 
11  1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A] (Mathew Bender, Rev. ed., 
2012). 
12 See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219. 
13  1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A] (Mathew Bender, Rev. ed., 
2012). 
14  Id. 
15 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006) (“Copyright in a work created . . . subsists from its creation . . .”); see also 
MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 48 (5th ed. 2010) (“[A] copyright comes into 
existence when an author takes the affirmative step of placing his or her work on a material object such as a 
piece of paper, digital media (e.g., a CD), or a block of marble . . . [A] copyright is created by the act of an 
author in fixing the work in a tangible medium of expression.”). 
16 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2006). 
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important role in the physical creation of the work.17 Copyright usually transfers to the new 
owner if the work is sold, unless the author contracts otherwise.18 Because copyright does 
not reside permanently in the artist, if a work is purchased along with the copyright it can be 
duplicated and used in commerce by an outside party. In this case the author will have lost 
her rights to exert control over the context and use of her work. 
The copyright owner has the rights to control reproduction, adaption, distribution, 
public performance, and public display of the work.19 Regardless of whether the author sells 
the copyright, its duration is the same. For works created in 1978 or later, copyright lasts for 
the life of the author plus seventy years.20 But for older works, the copyright protection is 
shorter.21 Works that have existed beyond their copyright term (including those which were 
created before recorded history) belong to the public domain.22 
Copyright only protects an original expression of an idea that is fixed in a tangible 
medium.23 The originality requirement is not a total novelty standard, but only demands that 
                                                          
17 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (The statutory definition of a “joint work” is “a work prepared by two or more 
authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a 
unitary whole.”); see also 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (“authors of a joint work are co-owners of copyright in the 
work.”). 
18 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2006); see also 1 JESSICA L. DARRABY, ART, ARTIFACT, ARCHITECTURE, AND 
MUSEUM LAW § 9:4 (2009); 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8C.04 
(Mathew Bender, Rev. ed., 2012). 
19 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
20 17 U.S.C. § 302(a). 
21 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §§ 9.01, 9.08 (Mathew Bender, Rev. 
ed., 2012). 
22 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 302, 303 (2006); Daniel Gervais, Traditional Knowledge & Intellectual Property: A 
TRIPS-Compatible Approach, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 137, 157 (2005). 
23 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). 
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the work was not actually copied from another author.24 Derivative works are allowed in 
order to avoid stifling the creative community.25 
Copyright applies to many kinds of expressions, including literature, photography 
and other pictorial art, music, dramatic works, choreography, sculpture, motion pictures, 
sound recordings or sheet music, and architectural works.26 In addition, useful articles, 
sometimes called “applied art,” are copyrightable.27 However, they may be copyrighted 
only to the extent that their design elements “can be identified separately from, and are 
capable of existing independently of,” the object’s utility.28 
2. Trademark 
Trademark is a body of law that protects artists’ designs and word marks when they 
are used to identify the source of a good in commerce.29 Trademarks are used by a seller to 
identify its goods, distinguish its goods from others, and to indicate the source of its 
goods.30 In order to receive trademark protection, the owner must use the mark in 
                                                          
24 See NIMMER, supra note 11, at § 2.01 (“Although in some early copyright cases, the distinction was not 
recognized, it is now clearly established, both as a matter of congressional intent and judicial construction, that 
the originality necessary to support a copyright merely calls for independent creation, not novelty.”) (footnotes 
omitted). 
25 Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436) (“If no book could be the subject 
of copyright which was not new and original in the elements of which it is composed, there could be no 
ground for any copyright in modern times, and we would be obliged to ascend very high, even in antiquity, to 
find a work entitled to such eminence.”); see NIMMER, supra note 11, at § 3.01. 
26 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
27 See NIMMER, supra note 11, at § 2.08[B][3]. 
28 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (“pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works”). 
29 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). 
30 Id. 
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commerce and the mark must be distinctive.31 Trademark protection includes the right to 
exclusive use of the mark.32 
3. Moral Rights 
Moral rights, on the other hand, are fundamentally personal rights that reside in the 
artist for her entire lifetime, and cannot be sold.33 They arose from the French tradition of 
droit moral, and a belief that an artist’s personality and reputation are intertwined with the 
art she creates.34 The theory of moral rights is that “the artist’s personality inextricably 
inheres in the work during the process of creation.”35 In order to protect the artist’s 
personality, the work itself must be protected; “[m]oral rights thus indelibly imbue the 
inanimate with aspects of the human psyche.”36 Moral rights include the rights of 
attribution, integrity, divulgation, and withdrawal.37 Moral rights generally last for the life 
of the artist.38 Therefore, moral rights give an artist a lifelong right to certain control over 
the art piece. 
4. Royalty Right 
                                                          
31 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051(a)(3)(C), 1052(f) (2006). 
32 See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2006). 
33 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e) (2006); see also DARRABY, supra note 19, at § 9:2. 
34 See NIMMER, supra note 19, at § 8D.01[A] (“In France, home country to the doctrine, these rights are 
known as le droit moral, or moral rights. ‘The adjective “moral” has no precise English equivalent, although 
“spiritual”, “non-economic” and “personal” convey something of the intended meaning.’”) (footnotes 
omitted). 
35 DARRABY, supra note 19, at § 9.2. 
36 Id. 
37 Id.; see also NIMMER, supra note 19, at § 8D.01[A]. 
38 See NIMMER, supra note 19, at § 8D.01[A]. 
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The fourth kind of intellectual property right in the family of intellectual property 
(IP) law concerning artists is the royalty right, or droit de suite. This doctrine provides a 
right for the artist to receive royalties for every resale of her work in a public forum,39 
adding a lifelong economic right to the artist’s bundle of IP rights.40 Droit de suite is not as 
widely accepted as a part of moral rights, and it is not recognized at all in U.S. federal law.  
However, it is recognized and required by the Berne Convention.41 The main justification 
for adopting droit de suite is that it makes up for other inequities in the copyright system.42 
As the copyright system stands, the artist is not able to benefit from an increase in value of 
a work after its original sale.43 
California enacted a royalty resale right in 1976,44 but the provision was struck 
down in May of 2012.45 The court held that the statute violated the Commerce Clause of the 
Constitution by attempting to regulate sales outside of the state of California.46 This means 
                                                          
39 See NIMMER, supra note 19, at § 8C.04[A]. 
40 See id. 
41 See id. at § 8C.04[A][2] (“The Berne Convention, to which the United States has adhered since March 1, 
1989, recognizes an ‘inalienable right to an interest’ in the resale of an original work of art and original 
manuscript. Given the failure of U.S. law (except California) to accord that protection, this country is arguably 
failing to honor its Berne commitments under that article.”). 
42 See Michael B. Reddy, The Droit de Suite: Why American Fine Artists Should Have the Right to a Resale 
Royalty, 15 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 509, 532–33 (1995); see also NIMMER, supra note 19, at  § 8C.04[A][1]: 
The prime (though not the sole) protection afforded by copyright is the right to control reproductions of 
a given work . . . Artists’ prime source of income derives instead from the sale of the original tangible 
embodiment of their artistic efforts. The money an artist receives upon the sale of a painting (even if he 
has reserved reproduction rights) usually represents the only income that he will receive from that 
particular work.
 
43 See Reddy, supra note 43. 
44 CAL. CIV. CODE § 986 (Deering 2012); see also Reddy, supra note 43, at 510–11. 
45 See Estate of Graham v. Sotheby's Inc., 860 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2012). 
46 Id. at 1126. 
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that in order for American artists to gain the droit de suite, the right would need to be added 
to federal law. However, in striking down California’s provision the court added, 
“[n]otably, several attempts by Congress to introduce resale royalty legislation have failed. 
In December 1992, the Copyright Office issued a report concluding that it was ‘not 
persuaded that sufficient economic and copyright policy justification exists to establish 
droit de suite in the United States.’”47 
B.
 
Existing Moral Rights Law in the United States 
The international standard for moral rights is set by the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,48 and is the starting point for moral rights 
analysis. Even though it was created in 1886, Berne is still the most important body of 
intellectual property law in the world.49 The original purpose of the Berne Convention was 
to set up international standards in order to ease international trade.50 It was originally 
created in 1886, sparked by a controversy when exhibitors refused to attend the 1873 
International Exhibition of Inventions in Vienna.51 Exhibitors refused to attend the 
                                                          
47 Id. at 1121 (citations omitted). 
48 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 
U.N.T.S. 221. 
49 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 9, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 299) (The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) was created 
more recently, but it incorporates all of Berne except for the moral rights provisions. No international law 
preempts the moral rights provisions of Berne; therefore Berne still provides binding intellectual property law 
for all signatory countries.) 
50 See WIPO Treaties–General Information, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/general/. 
51 Id. 
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International Exhibition of Inventors because they were afraid their ideas would be stolen 
and commercially exploited.52 
The United States did not join the Berne Convention until 1989.53 Part of the reason 
for this delay was that the United States’ laws needed to be significantly modified to come 
into compliance with the treaty, especially in the field of moral rights.54 However, the 
United States had a strong interest in joining Berne because the treaty included 85 nations, 
including all of America’s major trading partners.55 When the United States withdrew from 
the Universal Copyright Convention, it needed a new venue to influence international 
copyright standards.56 As the world’s largest exporter of copyrighted works, the United 
States had a strong interest in joining Berne, the world’s largest copyright convention.57 
Organized international piracy of American copyrighted works created a dire situation for 
domestic authors.58 
Because the Berne Convention was not considered self-executing, the United States 
passed the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 (BCIA) in order to join.59 The 
BCIA eliminated the notice and registration requirements that were disallowed by the Berne 
                                                          
52 Id. 
53 See LEAFFER, supra note 16, at 577. 
54 Id. 
55 Id.  
56 See id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 578; see also Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–568, 102 Stat 2853 
(1988). 
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Convention.60 After joining, American artists no longer had to rely on backdoor procedures 
to protect their works in Berne Convention member countries with which the United States 
had no other copyright agreements.61 
However, the United States was still not fully on the same page as the Berne 
Convention. The BCIA did not incorporate moral rights doctrine into U.S. law, because the 
Senate had contended the protections already existed under other federal and state laws.62 
By contrast, Article 6bis of the Berne Convention explicitly provides for moral rights, 
giving artists the rights of attribution and integrity.63 
In 1990, the United States passed the VARA in order to strengthen its compliance 
with the Berne Convention.64 Although the United States’ official position was that its laws 
already protected the artists’ rights mentioned in the Berne Convention, it passed VARA to 
explicitly include its provisions in U.S. domestic law.65 Thus, while the United States does 
                                                          
60 See LEAFFER, supra note 16, at 578. 
61 Id. at 582. 
62 See DARRABY, supra note 19, at 671. 
63 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 
1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221. 
(1) independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights, the 
author shall have the right to claim authorship [attribution] of the work and to object to any 
distortion, mutilation or other modification [integrity] of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the 
said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation. . . . (3) The means of redress for 
safeguarding the rights granted by this Article shall be governed by the legislation of the country 
where protection is claimed. 
Id. 
64 Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–650, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990) (codified in scattered 
sections of 17 U.S.C. (2006)). 
65 See LEAFFER, supra note 16, at 671 (quoting 136 CONG. REC. H13313 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statement 
of Rep. Kastenmeier)) (“While [VARA] is not necessary for this country’s adherence to the Berne Convention 
. . . it certainly strengthens our commitment to that convention.”). 
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provide moral rights protection to some artists, the limited scope of its protection leaves the 
United States lagging behind international moral rights norms. 
As indicated by its name, VARA provides protection to a very limited class of 
artists—those who create visual art.66 Unprotected authors include anonymous or unknown 
authors and group authors. This means that a tribe or people group who believe themselves 
to own their traditional cultural expressions collectively are not authors under VARA. 
VARA only protects the moral rights of attribution and integrity.67 Like other moral 
rights, VARA provides that the protected rights are not transferable and that they last for the 
life of the artist.68 Prior to joining the Berne Convention, the United States provided no 
post-sale rights for artists. Copyright is presumed to be passed along to the new owner, and 
any economic rights had to be reserved by contract.69 VARA now provides lifelong 
protection for some artists, but its limits are severe. The moral rights not granted by VARA 
                                                          
66 See 135 CONG. REC. E2227 (daily ed. June 20, 1989) (statement of Rep. Markey). Edward Markey, who 
helped introduce VARA to the House of Representatives in 1989, stated “I would like to stress that we have 
gone to extreme lengths to very narrowly define the works of art that will be covered . . . this legislation 
covers only a very select group of artists whose works have been allowed to fall through the existing gaps in 
our copyright law.” Id. Similarly, Representative Carlos Moorhead emphasized that his support for the 
legislation was based mostly on the fact that it was drafted so narrowly. The reason for this, he explained, is 
that “[a]n overriding concern throughout the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the 
Administration of Justice’s consideration of H.R. 2690, was . . . [to] not impede the efforts of U.S. copyright 
owners . . . In the subcommittee’s view, this narrow definition is essential to ensuring that the legislation is 
limited to protecting and preserving qualifying works that exist in single copies or limited editions.” 136 
CONG. REC. E3716–17 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1990) (statement of Rep. Moorhead). 
67 § 603, 104 Stat. at 5128–30. 
68 Id. 
69 See DARRABY, supra note 19, at 669. 
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include the right of divulgation and the right of withdrawal.70 It also does not provide for a 
resale royalty right, or droit de suite.71 
VARA also provides protection against the destruction of certain types of visual 
art.72 This is a subcategory of the right of integrity.73 However, this protection only applies 
to works that are deemed of “recognized stature.”74 Unfortunately, the term “recognized 
stature” is not clearly defined either in the statute or in case law.75 
The subject matter not protected by VARA is very broad. Anything that is not visual 
art is not protected, including music, film, crafts, writings, and folklore.76 VARA defines 
visual art to include a “painting, drawing, print, or sculpture . . . or a still photographic 
image produced for exhibition purposes only.”77 In addition, a qualifying work must be 
either a single copy or part of a numbered series of 200 or fewer.78 For prints, the burden of 
proof to show that the edition is limited rests with the author.79 Each copy must be 
consecutively numbered by the author and must be signed or bear an identifying mark of 
the author.80 
                                                          
70 See Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–650, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990) (codified in scattered 
sections of 17 U.S.C. (2006)). 
71 See id. 
72 § 603, 104 Stat. at 5128–30. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id.; see also DARRABY, supra note 19, at 689. 
76 See, e.g., § 602, 104 Stat. at 5128. 
77 Id. 
78 Id.  
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
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Because of the narrow scope of VARA, many genres of art protected by copyright 
do not receive any moral rights protection in the United States. Some obviously excluded 
groups are non-visual artforms, such as music and writing. However, other types of artwork 
are excluded as well. For example, motion pictures have been specifically excluded from 
VARA protection.81 The statute also excludes applied art, works made for hire, and.82 
Crafts are not explicitly excluded, but case law has held that embroidery on designer pants, 
puppets, and theater sets are not works of visual art.83 
Works published before the passage of VARA will only receive protection if title 
has not yet transferred from the author.84 This means that works created by indigenous 
groups are not likely to qualify for moral rights protection even if the work did fall under 
the definition of visual art under the statute because of when the copyright originally vested 
in the works.85 
II. APPLYING MORAL RIGHTS LAW TO NATIVE AMERICAN CULTURES 
A. Traditional Cultural Expressions: Why Copyright Does Not Fit 
 
Native American cultures have sharply contrasting conceptions of art and expression 
when compared with the West.86 The art of Native American cultures is fundamentally 
                                                          
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 DARRABY, supra note 19 at 673. 
84 § 610, 104 Stat. at 5132–33. 
85 Id. 
86 See, e.g., Jordan, supra note 2, at 102; Nancy Kremers, Speaking with a Forked Tongue in the Global 
Debate on Traditional Knowledge and Genetic Resources: Is U.S. Intellectual Property Law and Policy 
VARA’s Orphans: How Indigenous Artists Can Still Look for Hope in the Moral Rights 
Regime 
275 
 
integrated with their spirituality, their community, and their geography.87 In the field of 
IPR, this kind of art has been termed Traditional Cultural Expressions (TCEs).88 This 
category includes song, dance, oral traditions, and craft, among others.89 
From songs to pottery to textiles, traditional cultural expressions are not usually 
created for the purpose of being sold, but rather as an expression and preservation of their 
culture.90 Often TCEs are considered sacred knowledge, and they are not to be shared with 
outsiders or those without appropriate qualifications.91 Usually they have been created 
centuries earlier and have developed over time, keeping them out of the time frame of 
copyright protection.92 Some works are not fixed in a tangible medium, which is a 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Really Aimed at Meaningful Protection for Native American Cultures?, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J. 1, 13 (2004); Robert K. Paterson and Dennis S. Karjala,  Looking Beyond Intellectual Property in 
Resolving Protection of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Indigenous Peoples, 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 633, 640 (2003). 
87 See Kremers, supra note 87. 
[Traditional knowledge] is often intimately tied not just to the material object of the knowledge itself, 
but also to the larger environmental context of the knowledge. Traditional knowledge also is often 
deeply interwoven with spiritual or sacred concepts, and it is regularly expressed and preserved via 
ritualistic or artistic traditions that, unlike Western artistic habit, may be executed and passed down 
through generations only within firmly fixed parameters of expression. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
88 See, e.g., Terri Janke, Minding Culture: Case Studies on Intellectual Property and Traditional Cultural 
Expressions, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG. 71 (2003), 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/tk/en/studies/cultural/minding-culture/studies/finalstudy.pdf. 
89 See, e.g., Gervais, supra note 82, at 140 and 148. 
90 See Paterson, supra note 87, at 634. 
91 Stephanie Spangler, Note, When Indigenous Communities Go Digital: Protecting Traditional Cultural 
Expressions through Integration of IP and Customary Law, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 709, 726–27 
(2010). 
92 See Kremers, supra note 87, at 25 (“Traditional folkloric works may also not be considered ‘original’ in the 
copyright sense, because they are products of the cultural public domain, are developed incrementally over 
time, and are often executed according to strictly observed rules to which each successive generation of 
authors is bound.”). 
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requirement of copyright.93 In addition, copyrighted works eventually enter the public 
domain, which is contrary to the wishes and intentions of Native American creators.94 
A Navajo representative has elaborated on the depth of meaning of cultural 
expressions: 
A far greater difficulty we have is that the nonindigenous world does 
not understand that much of our cultural expression is inextricably 
linked in a holistic way with our spiritual life . . . . There is a propensity 
[among outsiders] to use terms like “myths” or “dances” for some of our 
cultural expressions, but these expressions actually have far deeper 
meaning . . . . We would never presume, by the same token, to call the 
Bible a “myth.” This is why we don't want these things out there in the 
world for marketing. To us, they are sacred.95 
 
Because of these differing cultural understandings of art, TCEs do not fit well into the 
Western copyright regime. The main conflicts with copyright law are that TCEs are too old 
for protection, they are not fixed in an appropriate medium, they are products of a 
community rather than an individual author, and they have not been created for the purpose 
of entering commerce.96 
1. Timing of Creation 
TCEs have often been part of a community’s culture for hundreds of years, and have 
even changed over time.97 Because the copyright clock starts ticking at the moment of 
                                                          
93 See Paterson, supra note 87, at 639–40. 
94 See Matlon, supra note 3, at 216. 
95 Id. at 211 note 4 (quoting Nancy Kremers, They Thought It First: Indigenous Peoples Push to Protect 
Their Traditional Knowledge, Genetic Resources, and Folklore, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 24, 2003, at IP21). 
96 See, e.g., Gervais, supra note 83, at 149–59. 
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creation, even if these expressions did qualify for copyright protection otherwise, they 
would long ago have passed into the public domain.98 The very age and rootedness of the 
tradition that gives such value to the expression makes it unprotectable in Western 
copyright law. 
2. Fixation 
Another important issue for Native American artists is that copyright law does not 
protect works unless they are fixed in a tangible medium.99 This creates a huge gap for 
expressions that are passed down through oral tradition such as folklore, music, and 
dance.100 Author Stephanie Spangler has made the argument that Native American 
communities should undertake the digital recording of their own intangible TCEs, such as 
videotaping traditional dances, in order to receive copyright protection.101 By making 
themselves the author of the digital recording, they solve the communal authorship problem 
while simultaneously meeting the fixation standard of copyright law. Then the community 
can keep the digitization private, use it in commerce, and use it as proof of ownership 
through enforcement mechanisms.102 However, because VARA excludes film and motion 
                                                          
98 See Gervais, supra note 23, at 157. 
99 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
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picture from its protection, recording their works would only provide Native Americans 
with copyright protection and not with rights of attribution and integrity.103 
Another complication with this approach is that the copyright resides in the person 
who actually records or photographs the expression.104 When non-native people, such as 
hired photographers or anthropologists, document TCEs, the copyright actually resides in 
the non-native individual who records and publishes the information.105 For example, 
outsiders have gained the benefits of copyright protection when they have translated oral 
traditions and published them in printed form.106 And “[s]imilarly, a photograph of an 
indigenous person in traditional attire confers copyright on the photographer but not on the 
subject of the photograph.”107 
3. Authorship 
Thirdly, TCEs are not created by individual authors, but rather are considered to be 
communally owned by the tribe.108 Traditional knowledge, which encompasses TCEs as 
well as scientific knowledge, has been defined as follows.109 
[T]raditional knowledge . . . is traditional only to the extent that its 
creation and use are part of the cultural traditions of a community–
“traditional,” therefore, does not necessarily mean that the knowledge 
is ancient or static; is representative of the cultural values of a people 
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and thus is generally held collectively; is not limited to any specific 
field of technology or the arts; is “owned” by a community and its use 
is often restricted to certain members of that community.110 
 
On the other hand, intellectual property protection applies to “[a]n identifiable 
author, inventor or other originator (who will be individually rewarded); An identifiable 
work, invention or other object; and Defined restricted acts.”111 This distinction between 
individual versus group authorship and ownership is fundamental.112 The only way multiple 
people can own a copyright in the United States is if each author played a significant role in 
actually creating the work (joint authorship) or if the author transferred ownership to others 
after its creation and thereby created a jointly owned work.113 Conversely, the idea of an 
individual artist having her own property interests is nonexistent in many native 
communities.114 
4. Purpose 
Finally, TCEs have not historically been created for the purpose of entering 
commerce.115 They are meant to function as an expression of culture for the present and a 
                                                          
110 Id. at 140–44. 
111 Id. at 141 (quoting Daniel J. Gervais, Spiritual But Not Intellectual? The Protection of Sacred Intangible 
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preservation of culture for the future.116 These pieces were not originally intended to be 
purchased by collectors for display in their homes. 
In light of this fundamentally different perspective on rights related to art and 
cultural expression, it follows that the right to benefit economically from the sale of a work 
may not be the first priority for native groups. When it comes to art that is valued by its 
creators more for its cultural heritage reasons than for its market price, the right to control 
distribution and copying are not important solely because of the lost economic benefit. 
Rather, there is a significant intangible value placed on maintaining the integrity and 
context of the work.117 
The very act of using Western intellectual property rules to protect TCEs means 
buying into the rules and structures that surround the intellectual property regime. This 
treatment may be conceived of as coercion in its own right. As one scholar explained, 
The classic distinctions of commercial objects, aesthetic objects, functional objects, 
and sacred objects becomes blurred in tribal communities, recognizing and exposing 
a society that is far more communal, both socially and productively. As such, the 
American copyright system is inherently contrary to the typical Native American 
tribal ethos. In addition, the American copyright scheme will continue to starve 
                                                          
116 See Riley, supra note 113, at 190 (“By its very nature, oral tradition is a passing down, a handing off, of 
creative expression. A work can be reborn and recreated each time it is sung; it takes on the needs of the tribe, 
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117 Paterson, supra note 87, at 658 (“Contemporary instances of appropriation include the use by non-
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to such practices goes beyond a sense of deprivation of economic opportunity. Cultural appropriation is 
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Native American tribes of cultural, spiritual, and intellectual works as individual 
artists turn their backs on tribal communities for economic gain.118 
For copyright, that means allowing the work to enter the public domain eventually, as well 
as assigning an economic value to TCEs.119 For trademarks, actual use in commerce is 
required to gain protection.120 In other words, the TCEs become commodified. Submitting a 
traditional expression to the copyright regime and eventually the public domain can be in 
direct conflict with tribal laws that require that the ownership rights must be “held in 
perpetuity.”121 These laws are based on the belief that the cultural value of these works is 
best maintained by tribal control over them.122 
One scholar says, “[t]he catch-22 that indigenous people are either forced to 
commodify their own cultural property and thereby perhaps misappropriate its position in 
the indigenous community or renounce commodification, thus allowing other non-
indigenous people to appropriate indigenous cultural traditions, has led to increasing 
frustration among indigenous communities with existing IPR regimes.”123 
This problem of purpose creates tension between the customary law of tribal 
communities and individual Native American artists who choose to reproduce sacred art for 
sale. The people who break the tribal laws governing art are the ones who gain the 
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protection of copyright “because their tangible, distilled use of the artwork out of its sacred 
context may pass the originality and fixation requirements of copyright law.”124 
Even for traditional cultural expressions that are created for the purpose of entering 
commerce, such as pottery and jewelry made for sale to art collectors and tourists, the rights 
provided to these artists are very limited. In this case, it is easier to identify a copyright 
author because the item is more likely to have been created by a specific person who will 
benefit from the income generated by the work. But it may still not be protected by 
copyright law because of subject matter issues, as is the case with handicraft. 
B. Traditional Cultural Expressions: Why Trademark Does Not Fit 
Trademark protection is severely limited by the fact that it only applies to marks that 
are used in commerce.125 While trademark protection could be used to identify the source of 
craft or art for sale, the protection has not been used this way. The Indian Arts and Crafts 
Act (IACA) was intended to have a free trademark program for Native American artists to 
use to register marks in order to identify their goods.126 Under the program, the Indian Arts 
and Crafts Board (“Board”) would apply for trademarks on behalf of Indians and tribes.127 
However, the program has never been implemented because U.S. trademark law requires 
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that the applicant for a trademark be using the trademark in commerce or intend to use the 
trademark within six months of filing.128 Therefore, only the Board’s own mark qualifies.129 
Lack of reliable copyright protection combined with the difficulty of attaining the 
protection of trademark law contributes to the problem of fraud. Native American crafts are 
often copied and passed off as authentic Native American art. Nancy Kremers elaborates on 
the ramifications of fraudulent use of TCEs, 
Labor-intensive local textiles, jewelry, and cultural artifacts are commonly copied 
and passed off as the work of indigenous craftspeople by entrepreneurs with access 
to capital and labor-saving machinery, and the duplicates are usually mass-produced 
and of poor quality. When cheap knockoffs flood local and export markets, the 
original artisans may cease working altogether. Traditional skills, methods, and 
designs, as well as the cultures they reflect, are thus permanently lost.130 
 
The IACA targets fraud by criminalizing the offer for sale of a good “in a manner 
that falsely suggests it is Indian produced.”131 The IACA allows an Indian tribe, Indian, or 
Indian arts and crafts organization to bring a civil action against anyone who sells a good in 
a manner that falsely suggests it is Indian-produced.132 However, the IACA has been 
criticized because of its requirement that an artist belong to a tribe recognized by the federal 
or state government in order to receive the protection offered by the act.133 The IACA also 
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does not provide a remedy when goods are both labeled “Indian-style” and are not intended 
to mislead, therefore the IACA only protects against intentional fraud.134 
In addition, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has created a 
database for Native American Tribal Insignia. The database is used as a reference tool for 
trademark examiners in order to prevent someone from registering a similar mark in order 
to falsely associate his or her goods with a tribe.135 However, tribes who use the database 
are not afforded other trademark protections. In 2003, the database consisted of only five 
tribal insignia.136 
III. HOW MORAL RIGHTS CAN HELP 
Traditional knowledge holders, a diverse group of peoples, differ in their own goals. 
Some want to control and benefit from their culture being disseminated and 
commercialized.137 Others want to prevent their knowledge from being taken by anyone in 
the outside world.138 
This dilemma—how to protect the sacred aspects (or, at least, the holistic essence) 
of TKGRF [Traditional Knowledge, Genetic Resources, and Folklore] via the laws 
of dominating cultures that tend to view and protect intellectual property as a 
commodity—is one of the perplexing problems that cuts across all TKGRF sectors 
and presents one of the thorniest legal issues confronting legislators and scholars.139 
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The experiences of the Saami people provide a tangible example of the need for 
indigenous art to remain in context. A representative of the Saami people group, who lives 
in the border area between Finland and Norway, spoke at a World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) conference to discuss the Saami people’s concerns about exploitation 
of their culture by outsiders who were copying and wearing Saami dress for commercial 
reasons.140 
When authentically designed and appropriately worn, this clothing is used 
within Saami culture to convey extensive and specific nonverbal information 
about the wearer’s family of origin, clan, geographic location, marital status, 
and other identity factors. When inappropriately worn and inauthentically 
designed by outsiders, it is robbed of the communication characteristics 
integral to its design and use in the indigenous society in which it 
originates.141 
 
Because the grounding and policy behind moral rights law is to protect the spirit of 
the artist and to protect her reputation, it is infinitely better suited to safeguard TCEs of all 
kinds. Relying on moral rights would also allow a compromise between the competing 
goals for Native Americans of safeguarding context and internalizing economic benefit. On 
the other hand, creating a specific legal regime tailored to the needs of TCEs may 
compromise the strength of copyright protection for artists who earn a living by making art 
and who fit into the required categories of copyright law. 
A. Strength of Moral Rights Protection if Fully Implemented 
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Rather than mere economic safeguards, Native American artists seek to protect the 
holistic essence of their works. A fitting example is the Navajo Nation and their continuing 
struggle against the secularization of their sacred art of sandpainting.142 The medicine men 
of the Navajo (hatathli) use sandpaintings during ceremonies in order to summon the Holy 
People to the ceremony.143 
During a specified point in the curative ceremony, the hatathli and any designated 
assistants will make a sandpainting on the floor of the hogan (a traditional Navajo 
dwelling). Using five special colors and traditional designs and techniques, the 
hatathli creates sandpaintings by drawing images of the Holy People over most of 
the sandy floor surface. These images are meant to be the exact pictorial 
representation of the Holy People; the Holy People are then summoned by the 
exactness.144 
 
After the ceremony is complete, the sandpainting is erased. Permanent drawings are 
traditionally believed to acquire too much power to be entrusted to the people.145 “This 
sacred art is meant to be respected and feared.”146 Some artists have made sandpaintings 
permanent and sold them outside of the tribe.147 This practice is very controversial within 
the Navajo community.148 
Moral rights allow the author to maintain a great deal of control over how the work 
is displayed and how it is used during her lifetime. The right of attribution is key because it 
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will allow the author(s) to claim authorship even in works being used by others. It will also 
ensure that whenever a work is displayed it is properly attributed to the tribal author and 
community. The right of integrity is important in order to prevent the work from being 
modified. Additionally, the right of divulgation would allow artists to control the terms 
under which a work is first displayed or exhibited, or decide when it is in fact complete. 
This right could be vital to help the artist safeguard contextual issues. And lastly, the right 
to withdrawal may be important in order to allow the author to remove a work from display 
and keep it within the privacy of her own community. 
B. Possibilities for Improvement of the Current Regime 
As detailed earlier, the moral rights provided by VARA are extremely limited in 
scope. Indeed, the rights of divulgation and withdrawal are not provided for at all in U.S. 
law. There is a lack of attribution rights for artists who do not create visual art of the kind 
detailed in VARA, which leaves out many craftspeople, musicians, and other artists. The 
right of integrity is also very limited, and only protects destruction of works that are of 
significant stature. 
It is clear that moral rights need to be expanded in the United States beyond the 
provisions of VARA. However, moral rights still provide a path to a promising future. 
Congress is constitutionally prevented from providing perpetual intellectual property 
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ownership because of the limited times provision.149 However, moral rights doctrine in the 
United States can be expanded to provide rights of divulgation and of withdrawal, allowing 
for significant control over contextual preservation and public availability of a work. If 
moral rights were expanded beyond visual artists to apply to crafts, music, and all other 
creative works now protected by copyright, many more indigenous art forms would be 
protected. 
Additionally, products of communal creativity can be explicitly included within 
statutory copyright and moral rights protections, as long as provisions are made to ensure 
that copyright will not last indefinitely. Currently, copyright duration is defined by the life 
of the individual artist, but there are other ways of limiting copyright terms. 
Such expansions to moral rights provisions would allow Native American artists and 
communities to protect the embedded spirit within their works. The provisions would also 
apply to works whether they were on display in a museum, held in private, or sold on the 
open market. This allows a great deal of flexibility for the law to allow each artist or 
community to decide what is important to them. These expansions could ease tensions 
within indigenous communities created by forcing an artist to disrespect or misappropriate 
cultural heritage if she wanted to use her works for economic gain. 
This improvement of moral rights by no means addresses every misalignment 
between indigenous art and western intellectual property law. But a powerful compromise 
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can be created by providing freedom for Native American artists to gain economically from 
their intellectual property while also empowering them to safeguard their cultural values. 
C. Attempts to Address the Unique Needs of TCEs in Other Jurisdictions 
Examination of the ways in which specific jurisdictions have tried to address these 
problems makes it easier to see that each alternative has a grave weakness. The application 
of customary tribal law to civil cases in Australia demonstrates the agonizing slowness of a 
case-by-case approach. Statutory schemes tailored to Native American craftspeople in New 
Mexico and Alaska provide protections and pitfalls similar to U.S. trademark doctrine. 
Two landmark cases in Australia shed light on how these issues are being dealt with 
around the globe. In Yumbulul v. Reserve Bank of Australia, an Aboriginal artist sued the 
Federal Reserve Bank for printing bank notes depicting one of his creations.150 Yumbulul 
created works for sale depicting traditional Aboriginal stories based on his cultural 
training.151 He was given authority by his clan to paint sacred designs, having passed 
through initiation and revelatory ceremonies in which he learned the designs and what they 
meant.152 The case was a dispute over a specific sacred object called the Morning Star Pole. 
Yumbulul had authority to create the sacred object, but claimed that the Reserve Bank had 
printed a depiction of the object without his or the clan’s permission.153 
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Yumbulul appealed to customary law, giving the clan a group copyright and 
prohibiting the pole from being reproduced by anyone without the proper training or 
context.154 However, the court found that there was no group copyright and that Yumbulul 
had legally signed a license allowing the pole to be reproduced.155 The court ignored 
Yumbulul’s argument based on customary law that the clan itself needed to give permission 
anytime a Morning Star Pole was reproduced.156 It is worth noting that submitting the 
Morning Star Pole to copyright protection, regardless of the results of the litigation, will 
ensure that the design will eventually enter the public domain.157 
The second case, Bulun Bulun v. R & T Textiles, involved an Aboriginal painter, 
authorized by his tribe to paint traditional designs, and an infringing textile company.158 
Bulun Bulun created and owned a copyright in the work in question, “Magpie Geese and 
Water Lilies at the Waterhole,” as a result of ritual knowledge derived from the tribe.159 
Unlike the holding in Yumbulul, the court here considered customary law in its holding. It 
held that Bulun Bulun owed fiduciary obligations to the tribe in respect to the artistic work, 
and held that “customary law can be used to provide a foundation for rights recognized 
within the Australian legal system.”160 The court held that Bulun Bulun held copyright in 
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the artwork not as an independent creator but as a fiduciary of the community who created 
the work.161 
While the Bulun Bulun compromise—acknowledging customary law and using it in 
the Australian court system—is extremely important, it cannot provide a strong solution for 
the United States. For example, relying on showings of customary law in court would 
require a slow approach, waiting for cases to come up one by one. And with the vast 
diversity of Native American cultures and tribal laws within U.S. jurisdiction, such an 
approach will likely be chaotic at best. 
New Mexico, which has a vibrant Indian art market, illustrates the gaps in protection 
for Native American artists. While the state’s Indian Arts and Craft Sales Act (IACSA) 
provides limited protection, it is not sufficient.162 
IACSA requires every person selling a product that is represented to be authentic 
Indian arts or crafts to make due inquiry of his suppliers into the true nature of the 
materials. While this requirement protects against fraud and false dealing, the 
IACSA offers only general protection with respect to attribution. The IACSA does 
not fully effectuate the moral right of attribution because it does not enable the 
individual Indian artist to be identified as the author of his or her specific works.163 
 
The IACSA specifically makes it a criminal offense to offer for sale an article represented 
as produced by an Indian if it was not actually created by the labor of an Indian.164 The 
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statute is intended to reduce fraud in New Mexico’s art market, protecting both artists and 
purchasers. It is important specifically to address the issue of fraud in Indian craft. 
However, this type of law only creates protection for works created by an individual artist 
and which are made for the purpose of entering commerce. 
The Silver Hand Program in Alaska was also created to prevent fraud in the market 
for Native American art.165 The program functions like a state-owned certification mark and 
is used to guarantee authenticity of goods being sold as Native American products.166 
Craftspeople must apply to the state for a Silver Hand permit.167 Once approved, they 
receive labels bearing the mark for use on their handcrafted goods.168 The program works to 
protect craftspeople and consumers alike. It protects artists from exploitation by those who 
would sell unauthorized copies as originals, thereby benefiting economically from passing 
goods off as authentically Native American. It also protects consumers by ensuring that 
what they are purchasing is authentic. In this way, the integrity of the Native American 
artistic community is protected from dilution by those who would copy their works. 
However, like the IACSA in New Mexico, the Silver Hand Program only protects 
individual Native American artists who are selling their creations to people outside of their 
communities. It requires an artist to submit her works into the stream of commerce in order 
for them to be protected in any way. 
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Reducing fraud by creating statutes and programs like the Silver Hand Program is 
an important step. However, fraud barely protects against very basic economic dilution and 
issues of theft. The more complex issues of protecting cultural context and catering to 
different uses of TCEs go overlooked. 
D. Challenges to the Moral Rights Solution 
The expansion of moral rights law within the United States can be accomplished. 
While moral rights rest on a different conceptual foundation than our statutory scheme 
creating economic incentives, there is no constitutional issue with expanding moral rights in 
the United States. The Constitution provides for intellectual property protection “to promote 
the progress of science and the useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and 
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”169 It is 
unfortunately not possible to provide perpetual intellectual property protection to 
indigenous artists because of the “limited times” restriction. However, the concept of 
protecting the spirit of the artist inherent in her work is fully compatible with promoting 
progress through exclusive rights. Congress has already adopted limited moral rights 
provisions by passing VARA. Expanding the legislation to provide more complete moral 
rights to more types of artists and other types of creative works would not present any new 
constitutional issues. 
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While traditionally the United States has had a strong focus on economic rights, 
Congress has proven willing to change copyright policy in order to align themselves with 
their international trade partners. The focus on protecting indigenous artists is a worldwide 
movement and is gaining ground within WIPO through initiatives such as the Creative 
Heritage Project170 and the Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and 
Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge, and Folklore.171 
Additionally, the federal government has a fiduciary relationship with Native 
American tribes and has “articulated the importance of ensuring the cultural survival of 
tribes and shown a general willingness to adopt laws aimed at promoting tribal cultural 
integrity.”172 It is foreseeable that the United States would find it beneficial to make these 
sorts of changes in the future. 
States can create their own moral rights laws in order to provide protection for their 
citizenry until the federal government expands its moral rights laws. In fact, states are in an 
optimal position to take the lead on moral rights provisions because they know the needs 
within their own regions. They are familiar with the tribes located within their territories 
and are also familiar with the nature of the art market that exists within their borders. 
The Copyright Act of 1976, and therefore VARA, as a part of the Act, has a 
preemption clause. This means that state moral rights laws are preempted to the extent that 
                                                          
170 See Creative Heritage Project: Strategic Management of IP Rights and Interests, WORLD INTELL. PROP. 
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they provide rights equivalent to integrity and attribution to works that fall within the 
subject matter of VARA. Since crafts do not fall into the subject matter of copyright 
generally, all state regulations related to protecting craft are free from risk of preemption.173 
However, ultimately the patchwork of state laws will not provide the reliable protection that 
would come from a federal expansion of moral rights. It will also be difficult to provide 
some protections that affect interstate commerce. Indeed, California’s droit de suite has 
been recently struck down after decades of operation for this very reason.174CONCLUSION 
While Native American artists and communities have many difficulties protecting 
their artistic expressions under the current legal regime, hope is not lost. The well-
developed moral rights doctrine from the civil law tradition is ready and waiting to be 
implemented more strongly in the West in order to protect not only the economic rights of 
artists, but their spirit and culture as well. 
Moral rights doctrine is well-developed in civil law traditions and can readily be 
imported into our own IP regime. It is well suited to protecting the personality, the spirit, 
and the identity embedded within traditional cultural expressions. The protection of the 
embedded identity is vital because for cultures that often do not have a written language to 
record their past, creative works are the way they preserve their cultural identity. 
No matter how we twist and interpret copyright law, its protections will never meet 
these needs. Specific legal regimes designed to protect Native American artists may not 
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survive constitutional scrutiny, or may not be adequate for the task. The programs in Alaska 
and New Mexico are perfect examples, because they only address the issue of fraud. Thus, 
the economic rights remain the only element that is protected. 
Australia’s approach has been to combine customary law with civil law in order to 
recognize the inner rules of tribes that protect their sacred knowledge.175 But this approach 
is not practical for the United States. Considering the fact that customary law in cases 
involving Native Americans will take a long time, and will proceed on a case-by-case basis, 
it is unlikely to be accepted in our legal system. However, moral rights law, when expanded 
to protect traditional cultural expressions, will allow native artists to exploit their works 
economically, to control the dissemination of their art, and to put a stop to the dilution of 
their culture. 
                                                          
175 See discussion supra Part III C. 
